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Madras HC Plea: Abolish VIP Darshan, Citing Constitutional Rights

A petition in the Madras High Court challenges VIP darshan in Tamil Nadu temples, arguing it violates fundamental rights and Sanatana Dharma principles. The plea cites Articles 14, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution.

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#VIP Darshan#Madras High Court#Hindu Temples#Constitutional Rights#HR & CE Act#Religious Freedom
Madras HC Plea: Abolish VIP Darshan, Citing Constitutional Rights — SuperLaw

A petition filed before the Madras High Court challenges the institutionalised practice of special and VIP darshan in temples administered by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR & CE) Department of Tamil Nadu. The plea, moved by P Chockalingam, president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s North Tamil Nadu unit, seeks a declaration that the levying of extra fees for privileged access to sanctums violates the egalitarian ethos of Sanatana Dharma and contravenes fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. The bench comprising Justices GR Swaminathan and V Lakshminarayanan has issued notice to the HR & CE Department and adjourned the matter to 29 May 2025 for a substantive hearing.

The petitioner’s core contention rests on two interlocking arguments. First, he asserts that neither the HR & CE Act, 1959 nor any recognised Hindu scripture sanctions a system whereby devotees may purchase expedited or exclusive access to the deity by paying a premium. Second, he argues that the present arrangement amounts to state‑sanctioned discrimination that undermines the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law and the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion. In support of the first limb, Chockalingam points to Section 6(15)(b) of the HR & CE Act, which empowers the department to “make provisions for the better management and administration of temples.” He reads this provision narrowly, maintaining that it authorises only administrative measures—such as security, sanitation and crowd control—not revenue‑generating schemes that differentiate devotees on the basis of wealth or social standing.

On the constitutional front, the petition invokes the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, which prohibits the State from enacting laws or policies that treat similarly situated persons unequally without a reasonable justification. The petitioner contends that the classification created by special darshan—distinguishing between those who can afford the fee and those who cannot—lacks a rational nexus to any legitimate state objective. He further relies on Article 25(1), which guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health. The argument here is that the imposition of a financial barrier to darshan impedes the free exercise of religion for economically disadvantaged devotees, thereby rendering the practice an unreasonable restriction on religious liberty.

The petition also cites Article 19(1)(g), which protects the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Although the provision primarily concerns economic freedoms, the petitioner argues that the State’s exploitation of religious sentiment for revenue generation constitutes an improper interference with the devotees’ right to engage in worship without undue pecuniary burden. Finally, Article 21’s guarantee of protection of life and personal liberty is invoked to assert that the State cannot subject citizens to degrading or exploitative conditions that diminish their dignity—a point the petitioner reinforces by referencing the Supreme Court’s observation in *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India* (1978) that Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity.

To assess the merit of these claims, it is useful to examine precedent concerning the State’s role in religious institutions. The Supreme Court’s decision in *Shirur Mutt v. State of Madras* (1954) upheld the validity of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, recognising the State’s authority to regulate the administration of religious endowments to prevent mismanagement and protect public interest. However, the Court also emphasized that such regulation must not interfere with the essential religious practices of the denomination. Later, in *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India* (1994), the Court reiterated that secularism does not entail hostility towards religion but requires the State to treat all religions equally and to refrain from privileging any particular sect. The present petition aligns with this jurisprudence by arguing that the HR & CE Department’s revenue‑driven darshan scheme creates a de facto privileging of wealthier devotees, thereby violating the principle of equal treatment.

Another relevant authority is *Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police* (2004), where the Court struck down a police regulation that imposed a fee for access to a public religious procession, holding that the imposition of a financial condition on the exercise of a fundamental right was unconstitutional absent a clear and justifiable purpose. Though the factual matrix differs, the underlying principle—that the State may not condition the enjoyment of a religious right on the payment of a fee unless the fee is directly tied to a legitimate regulatory objective—resonates with the petitioner’s challenge.

From a practical standpoint, the outcome of this litigation could reshape the financial architecture of temple administration in Tamil Nadu. The HR & CE Department currently relies on special darshan revenues to supplement its budget for maintenance, security and infrastructural upgrades across thousands of shrines. A judicial declaration that such fees are unlawful would compel the department to seek alternative funding mechanisms, potentially increasing reliance on state grants, donations or commercial leasing of temple properties—each of which carries its own set of legal and procedural hurdles. Temple trustees, who often function as intermediaries between the department and devotees, would need to revisit their operational manuals, training staff to enforce uniform access protocols and recalibrating donation solicitation strategies to avoid any perception of coercion.

For legal practitioners, the case offers a fertile ground for advising religious institutions, charitable trusts and state agencies on the limits of regulatory authority over religious endowments. Counsel representing temple management will need to demonstrate that any differentiated access scheme serves a substantial state interest—such as crowd control during peak festivals—and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest without imposing an undue financial burden on devotees. Conversely, petitioners challenging similar practices elsewhere in the country may draw on the Madras High Court’s reasoning to argue that the mere existence of a revenue motive does not satisfy the constitutional test of reasonableness under Articles 14 and 25.

Citizens, particularly regular worshippers and marginalised devotees, stand to gain a clearer articulation of their right to equal access to places of worship. Should the court uphold the petition, it would reinforce the notion that religious spaces funded or overseen by the State must remain open to all on equal terms, irrespective of economic status. This could also spur broader social movements advocating for the elimination of other forms of preferential treatment—such as paid archakas (priests) for specific rituals or tiered prasadam distribution—thereby fostering a more inclusive devotional environment.

The matter also raises questions about the interplay between customary practices and statutory regulation. While the petitioner contends that special darshan is a “new innovation” introduced after the advent of Dravidian party governance, historical evidence suggests that varying levels of access have existed in certain temples for centuries, often linked to patronage by royalty or affluent benefactors. The court will need to discern whether such historical practices, if proven, can be accommodated within the modern constitutional framework, or whether they must be re‑evaluated in light of contemporary egalitarian norms.

In sum, the Madras High Court’s forthcoming adjudication will serve as a bellwether for the extent to which the State may monetise religious access without transgressing constitutional safeguards. By interrogating the legitimacy of fee‑based darshan through the lenses of equality, religious freedom and dignified existence, the judgment has the potential to recalibrate the balance between administrative exigency and the fundamental right to worship—a balance that lies at the heart of India’s secular promise. The legal community, temple administrators and devotees alike will watch closely as the bench weighs these competing imperatives on 29 May 2025.